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Global economic integration creates new kinds of risks for national
security. Foreign ownership of U.S. telecommunications service providers
is one such risk. While foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies are almost
always harmless, there has always been concern among federal officials
that foreign ownership could multiply opportunities for espionage, make
defenders' tasks more complex, and reduce law enforcement
communications interception capabilities. A new concern is that foreign
acquisitions are a new avenue for a potential opponent to disrupt critical
infrastructure and the services. The issue for national security is how to
preserve communications interception capabilities and defend against
potential service disruptions or intelligence activities in a period where
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integrated, global telecommunications enterprises and foreign ownership
of, or participation in, national networks is increasingly routine.
I. NEW CHALLENGES
Communications interception is an integral part of law enforcement
and intelligence activities. Nations have engaged in the interception of
electronic communications for more than a century. Most countries have
agencies, policies, and legal structures that control and take advantage of
interception techniques. These control mechanisms also secure the
country's own communications networks and information from the
interception efforts of others.'
Communications interception techniques can be divided into two
broad categories: bulk interception and targeted interception. Bulk
interception is the collection of all signals or emanations regardless of who
sends them. The mass of signals are then processed and filtered to discover
meaningful information. This technique is primarily used by intelligence
agencies and is derived from military signals intelligence efforts that began
shortly before World War I when militaries began to monitor the radio
spectrum for transmissions of interest. 2 The zenith for bulk collection
efforts was in the 1980s and since then the effectiveness of these
techniques has been degraded by advances in information technology.
3
The second category, targeted interception, involves collecting
against an individual user or device. This includes the techniques that fall
under the rubric of wiretapping, but also new techniques developed for
targeted collection on the Internet (these techniques often resemble
spyware). Targeted collection frequently requires intrusive measures (as
opposed to the more passive bulk collection techniques) which involve
direct physical access to the communications medium or to the physical
space of the target to collect data. It is difficult and costly to do this
covertly. Targeted collections, and their requirement for access, are more
intrusive and can pose a greater risk to civil liberties.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
("CFIUS") is part of a broader effort in the United States to maintain
interception capabilities. The United States seeks to preserve its
1. Eur. Parl. Doc., Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of
Private and Commercial Communications (A5-0264/2001) 27-28 (2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/rapport-echelon-en.pdf [hereinafter Interception of
Communications].
2. See generally John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy From
Napoleon to Al-Qaeda (2003).
3. See id. at 14-16. See also JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE
ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 647-48 (First Anchor Books 2002) (2001).
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interception capabilities while limiting foreign interception opportunities.
Since the end of the Cold War, implementation of this policy has required
repeated responses to changes in technology that would have otherwise
degraded U.S. capabilities. The technological improvements that made
communications technologies better and cheaper can also make
interception more difficult. These improvements included the use of fiber
optics, packet switching, strong commercial encryption, and the spread of
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VolP"). 4 Many of the regulatory battles
between the federal government and the telecommunications and
information technology industry in the 1990s, such as the Communications
Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), encryption, Carnivore,
Patriot Act modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA")-involved federal efforts to constrain or respond to technological
change.
Technological challenges to interception are now complemented by
challenges that arise from changes in the international economic
environment: the globalization of supply chains and ownership, especially
foreign ownership of U.S. telecommunications networks. This new
challenge will shape future policy and regulatory interventions of
communications interception.
This development has grown out of a broader set of economic and
political changes. These changes have made the task of interception more
difficult. Regulations that emphasize private ownership and competition in
telecommunications have reduced the number of national monopoly service
providers that, since they were very often owned completely or in part by
the government or were themselves a government agency, had a tradition
of close cooperation with national authorities. Regulatory changes and
improved technologies have lowered the cost of communications and
helped contribute to growth in the volume of traffic, which also
complicates intelligence activities.5  The profusion of services,
technologies, and service providers also complicates interception efforts.
The economic benefit of these changes clearly outweighs the cost to law
enforcement and intelligence, but few governments appear to be willing to
accept the accompanying erosion of capabilities.
A more gradual set of challenges to interception emerged from the
regulatory and policy changes that encouraged global economic integration
4. "[M]odem telecommunications technology poses significant challenges to [signals
intelligence] ..." National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Signals Intelligence,
at http://www.nsa.gov/sigintlindex.cfm [hereinafter Signals Intelligence]. See also
BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 440-63.
5. See Signals Intelligence, supra note 4; BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 440-63;
Interception of Communications, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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and the internationalization of ownership. American foreign policy for
more than a century has encouraged an open, international economy and
the removal of restrictions to trade and foreign investment. Technological
change reinforces globalization. Expanded trade, new technologies, and the
resultant international economic integration changed how companies must
do business if they want to remain financially and technologically viable.
These changes, however, have created a new series of concerns in the
national security community.
The crux of these concerns is that the United States faces new kinds
of threats to its defense that fall outside of traditional military and
intelligence activities. This belief grows out of changes in the international
security and economic environment that followed the end of the Cold War.
A series of commissions grappled with the problem of how to adjust U.S.
security policies in the new environment in the 1990s. These commissions
concluded that national security would face new kinds of threats from
opponents, who would use unconventional and asymmetrical modes of
attack with unconventional weapons, and exploit vulnerabilities within the
American infrastructure.6 Weapons of mass destruction formed the
principle source of asymmetrical threats to the homeland, but information
and communications systems were also seen as especially vulnerable. 7 This
highlights the emphasis in homeland security on new threats to security and
a new sense of vulnerability that pervades policymaking.8
There is no coherent strategy in the United States for dealing with
these issues, in part because they are new and in part because they cut
across the responsibilities of existing agencies. Much of the activity in
national security during the last ten years, beginning with Presidential
6. Frank Cilluffo et al., Center for Strategic and International Studies, Defending
America in the 21 st Century: New Challenges, New Organizations, and New Policies (2000)
(providing an executive summary of four CSIS working group reports on homeland
defense), available at http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/defendamer2 stexecsumm.pdf.
7. "Our economy and national security are fully dependent upon information
technology and the information infrastructure." White House, The National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace viii (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/
cyberspace-strategy.pdf [hereinafter Secure Cyberspace].
8. The reports include: The Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report
to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence (1994), at
http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/jsc-report.pdf; Defense Science Board, Dept. of
Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense
(1996), at http://www.acq.osd.milldsb/reports/iwd.pdf; National Commission on Terrorism,
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism (2000), at
http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intellterrorism/NCTReport2000.pdf; National Defense
Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (1997), at
http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf; The President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures (1997),
at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Infrastructure.pdf.
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Decision Directive 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 9 the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security, and the publication of both the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and
Key Assets10 and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,'' focused on
developing a policy framework for a new security environment where a
territorial concept of security is no longer.adequate to describe the nature or
source of potential threats.12
In the earlier territorial concept of security, borders were clearly
demarcated, industries were national, and key services were state-owned or
provided by national firms. This made the management of security tasks
(such as communications interception) easier for national authorities.
However, the economic underpinnings of this territorial approach have
been eroded. Agreements on international trade and finance, buttressed by
technological developments, made it easier for nationals of one country to
own and invest in companies and provide services in another country.
13
International agreements to remove regulatory obstacles for foreign
ownership, combined with national economic policies that privatize and
deregulate key services are increasing the integration of national
economies.
Opening the door for American companies to sell or own property
outside the United States has been a hallmark of American foreign policy.
The United States routinely seeks bilateral and multilateral investment
trade agreements to promote free trade. The recent focus of trade
liberalization was to remove barriers to direct foreign investment and
ownership by foreign nationals of key services, such as
telecommunications. 14  The 1998 World Trade Organization Basic
9. White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63: Critical Infrastructure
Protection (May 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pddlpdd-63.htm.
10. See WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical-strategy.pdf [hereinafter INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION].
11. See SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 8.
12. "In the last century, geographic isolation helped protect the United States from
direct physical invasion. In cyberspace national boundaries have little meaning." Id. at 7.
See also INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 11.
13. Trade in Telecommunications Services: Before the House Commerce Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Protection, Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000),
available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2000_09/alia/a0090716.htm (testimony of Richard
W. Fisher, Deputy U.S. Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Fisher Testimony on Telecommunications
Services].
14. See, e.g., Director General, Supachai Panitchpakdi, Introductory Remarks at the
WTO Public Symposium: WTO After Ten Years: Global Problems and Multilateral
Solutions (Apr. 20, 2005), at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spsp-e/spsp38_e.htm.
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Agreement on Telecommunications Services expanded the ability of
foreign owners (with certain caveats detailed in the agreement) 15 to enter
telecommunications markets and furthered the trends in technology,
causing partnering agreements and ownership in telecommunications to be
increasingly linked across borders.1 6 Negotiations in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") furthered liberalizations in the trade of
telecommunications services. 17
The results of consolidation in the telecommunications industry, and
the effect of WTO agreements that break down the barriers to firms in one
country providing services in another, have increased the blending of
ownership. However, while American firms were investing overseas,
foreign firms were investing in the United States. Foreign investment is
vital to the national economy, and the United States could not deny to others
the rights it has sought for itself. Some forms of investment, where a
foreign entity assumes ownership and control of a U.S. plant or facility,
raise national security concerns. Telecommunications services are now
routinely provided through cross-border arrangements between companies.
Increasingly, services are also provided by foreign-owned firms that own
and operate telecommunications networks.
Communications interception poses an indirect, but real challenge for
critical infrastructure. In part, this is because the United States defined
critical infrastructure protection to include information assurance.
Communications interception is problematic because of concerns that
access to information networks could provide the capability to disrupt
critical services. Communications interception capabilities are, in essence,
15. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, FOURTH PROTOCOL TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TRADE IN SERvICES (April 30, 1996), at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
4protes120_e.pdf. The Fourth Protocol, which applied to basic telecommunications
services, entered into force on January 1, 1998.
16. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 2000 UPDATE 3-4 (May 200 1);
World Trade Organization, Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trades in
Services, April 30, 1996, S/L/20 (96-1750), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal4potesl20_e.pdf; INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, GLOBAL MARKET
TRENDS, ITU NEWS (2003).
The United States, through the FCC, responded to the 1996 agreement in the WTO,
by issuing two implementing orders to allow foreign investors from WTO member states to
enter the market: the Foreign Participation Order, and the DISCO 11 Order. Both orders
appeared in 1997. See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecomm.
Mkt., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 23,891 (1997); Amendment of the Commission's
Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed Space Station to Provide Domestic and
Int'l Satellite Serv. in the United States; Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 24,094 (1997).
17. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Telecommunications Services, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/serv_e/telecom_eltelecom_e.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2005).
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a critical government service provided by telecommunications companies.
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was formulated, in part, to
describe initiatives to "secure our information systems against deliberate,
malicious disruption"' 8 and to identify "strategic information warfare" as a
source of catastrophic risk for the Homeland Security Strategy. 
19
II. THE CFIUS PROCESS
The United States has three regulatory vehicles to control foreign
ownership in the telecommunications sector. These vehicles are vested in
the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Communications Division,
and-to a lesser extent-the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 20 The first of
these vehicles is the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC")
ability to review the transfer of licenses. 21 The Communications Act of
1934 prohibits the transfer of an FCC license to a corporation of which a
foreign government owns 25 percent or more, but gives the FCC the
authority to waive this provision if it judges the license to be in the public
interest.22 The FCC routinely defers, however, to executive branch
agencies, such as the DOJ and the Department of Defense in determining
the effect of the acquisition on national security. The second of these
vehicles is the DOJ's ability to review the proposed purchase for antitrust
implications.23 The third and most important of these three vehicles is the
Treasury Department's chaired CFUS. The United States created the
CFIUS process in 1988 as part of a larger trade liberalization policy to
review the potential national security implications of foreign acquisitions of
U.S. firms. Section 5021 of the landmark Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 amended section 721 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950 to give the President the authority to suspend or
prohibit any foreign acquisition, merger, or takeover of a U.S. corporation
that is determined to threaten national security.24
18. OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 5
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/natstrathls.pdf.
19. Id. at 2.
20. Fisher Testimony on Telecommunications Services, supra note 14 (identifying the
"tools available to address competition and national security concerns posed by foreign
government ownership" as the FCC's Public Interest Test (particularly section 310(b)(4) of
the Communications Act of 1934)).
21. Communications Act of 1934, § 310,48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 310).
22. § 310(a), (b)(4).
23. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, CH. I: STATUTORY
PROVISIONS AND GUIDELINES OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/
divisionmanual/ch2.htm (last visited April 3, 2005).
24. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND
INVESTMENT 59 (Brussels, Dec. 2003), available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/
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CFIUS is an interagency body staffed by midlevel officials and
chaired by the Treasury Department. The Departments of Defense, State,
Justice, and Commerce are among the agencies that participate in the
CFIUS process. Representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") and the intelligence community are also involved, sometimes in an
advisory capacity. President Bush made the Department of Homeland-
Security ("DHS") a member of CFIUS in February 2003.25 CFIUS was
originally created to monitor the economic implications of foreign
investment in the United States, which is why the Treasury Department
chairs it; but in 1988, Congress gave it the role of reviewing the national
security implications of foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies. This is
now its most important function.26
Most foreign purchasers are not required to file with CFIUS, but if
they do not and CFIUS later decides that it objects to the purchase, the
United States can force the new foreign owner to divest itself of the
acquisition. Many companies decide it is safer to notify theTreasury
Department. After notification, CFIUS has one month in which to decide
whether or not to investigate the proposed sale. If it does not choose to
investigate, the sale can proceed. CFIUS finds very few submissions
warrant investigation. Only a few of the more than two thousand
notifications received by CFIUS since 1988 were investigated, and of
these, only one was blocked.27 In most cases, if CFIUS chooses to open an
docs/2003/december/tradoc_ 15383.pdf.
25. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order
Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection with the Transfer of
Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security (Feb. 28, 2003), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/O2/print/20030228-8.html [hereinafter
Homeland Security Executive Order].
26. OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, COMMITrEE
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, Exon-Florio Provision, at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/intemational-affairs/exon-florio/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Exon-Florio Provision].
27. In 1990, a Chinese firm was ordered to divest itself of an U.S. aircraft parts
manufacturer. Details are as follows:
[I]n February 1990... President Bush ordered CATIC, the import-export arm of
the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the People's Republic of China, to divest its
interest in MAMCO, a privately owned, Seattle-based manufacturer of civilian
airplane parts, primarily for Boeing. Although CATIC notified CFIUS of the
proposed acquisition, the transaction was closed before completion of the initial
review period. The sale was perfectly legal, but it turned out to be an unfortunate
and costly decision when President Bush later ordered divestiture.
Susan W. Liebeler and William H. Lash III, Exon-Florio: Harbinger of Economic
Nationalism?, REGULATION, Winter 1996, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regl6nld.html,
A variety of sources carry statistics on CFIUS cases. See General Accounting
Office, Implementation of Exxon Florio and related Amendments, at 3-4 (Dec. 1995), at
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investigation, companies respond by abandoning the planned acquisition
or, in a smaller number of cases, by offering to restructure the acquisition
in a way that addresses the security concerns raised by CFIUS. In 2004,
CFIUS reviewed forty-five cases and referred only one to the President for
a decision.
28
The formal CFIUS review is not the most important element in the
approval process. CFIUS does not require unanimity among all the
agencies involved, but a disputed decision to approve a sale would be
escalated to the cabinet level or to the President for appeal. 29 The Treasury
Department has been reluctant to engage in such escalation. The timelines
for decision included in the authorizing legislation to ensure a speedy
CFIUS decision can be suspended by the Treasury Department in a process
known as "stopping the clock," usually justified on the grounds that further
information is needed from the purchaser. Most applicants support this
delay since the alternative is potential rejection.3° In effect, this gives
individual agencies a kind of de facto veto that allows them to use the
pending CFIUS decision to gain leverage and concessions from foreign
purchasers.
Until now, the most influential agencies in the CFIUS process were
the Department of Defense and the DOJ. These are also the agencies most
likely to be affected by a foreign purchase. Both agencies will often defer
casting their vote in CFIUS until such time as they have been able to
arrange side agreements with the foreign purchaser that assuage their
security concerns.
31
The Department of Defense's concerns in cases involving
telecommunications focus on communications security.32 The Department
http://www.fas.orglasmp/resources/govern/gao9 6 12.pdf; Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Industrial Policy, Frequently Asked Questions: What is CFIUS?, at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/faq.html#number5 (last visited May 2, 2005); Department of the
Treasury, Annual Performance Report: Performance and Accountability Report FY 2004,
pt. II, at 47 (2004), at http://www.treas.gov/offices/management/dcfo/accountability-
reports/2004reports/part2.pdf (last visited May 2, 2005); Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, International Trade Alert: CFIUS National Security Review Creates New Uncertainty
for Foreign Investment in the United States, (May 2003), at http://www.akingump.coml
docs/publication/562.pdf [hereinafter Akin Trade Alert].
28. Department of the Treasury, Annual Performance Report: Performance and
Accountability Report FY 2004, pt. II, at 47 (2004), at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
management/dcfo/accountability-reports/2004reports/part 2 .pdf (last visited May 2, 2005).
29. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 800, subpts. E, F (2003).
30. See 31 CFR § 800.403 (2003).
31. See Bryan Tramont, Too Much Power, Too Little Restraint: How the FCC Expands
its Reach Through Unenforceable and Unwieldy 'Voluntary' Agreements, 53 FED. COMM.
L.J. 49, 53-54 (2000).
32. The Department of Defense's primary concern in most CFIUS cases is to prevent
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of Defense built on the CHUS process by suggesting that defense-related
firms meet informally with Department of Defense staff before making a
submission to CFIUS.33 Companies that do not informally consult with the
Department of Defense run the risk of having the Department of Defense
announce that the thirty days allowed by law were not enough to review the
transaction.34 Some firms have had to temporarily withdraw their CFIUS
petitions in order to give the Department of Defense more time.
Withdrawal is often done to propose and work out arrangements with the
acquiring party that place restrictions on the acquisition to resolve national
security concerns. 35 The Department of Defense's own regulations, such as
the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual reinforce
CFIUS by requiring notification and approval of foreign acquisitions or
mergers from companies that operate cleared facilities.36
The goals of the DOJ and the FBI in CFIUS cases involving
telecommunications or network services include both communications
security and ensuring a continued ability to engage in communications
interception. Avoiding degradation to communications interception usually
formalizes understandings with the new owner that U.S. law regarding
communications interception, as opposed to the laws of the purchasing
country, continues to apply and that the informal cooperation often
obtained from U.S. service providers will continue with the new foreign-
owned entity. In some cases, assurances are sought that network operations
data, which is of use to law enforcement, will continue to be stored in the
United States or that the corporation will create special U.S. citizen-only
units to handle law enforcement requests.37
the illicit acquisition or transfer of technology by the new foreign owners. See OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITIONS, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/faq.html (last visited April 3, 2005).
33. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Frequently AskedQuestions: What is CFIUS?, at http://www.acq.osd.millip/faq.html#number5 (last visited
May 2, 2005). The site specifically states:
Firms that are planning a CFIUS filing that involves sensitive and/or extensive
defense contracts are encouraged to meet informally with staff of DUSD(Industrial Policy) and other relevant DoD components prior to formal CEIUS
notification so that DoD analysis of the transaction can begin before the start of
the 30-day initial review clock.
34. Id.
35. See id.; John B. Reynolds, III, Foreign Direct Investment in U.S. Critical
Infrastructure (2004), at http://www.wrf.com/publication.cfm?pf= I &publication -id=1 1735.
36. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING
MANUAL, Ch. II, Sec. 3 (1995, incorporating changes through 2001), available at
http://www.dss.mil/isec/nispom.pdf [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATING
MANUAL].
37. Reynolds, supra note 36.
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One indication of the changing policy interests that drives CFIUS and
foreign ownership concerns is the addition of the DHS via presidential
directive.38 The DHS's role and influence in CFIUS reviews of foreign
telecommunications acquisitions was strengthened by the transfer of the
National Communications System ("NCS")-an agency created in the
Kennedy Administration to improve, secure, and increase the survivability
of the telecommunications network.39 Originally part of the Department of
Defense, the NCS is now part of the DHS's infrastructure protection
directorate and provides the agency with expertise and long-standing
relationships with service providers.4 °
The concerns raised by the FBI, the DOJ, or the Department of
Defense are usually resolved through the negotiation of a Network Security
Agreement, a document, usually confidential, that lays out conditions to
which a foreign purchaser must adhere for the transaction to win CFIUS
approval. 41 These conditions can include limiting the performance of
certain functions to U.S. citizens; establishing understandings on where
data will be stored, often a requirement that data remain in the United
States; or, in more draconian agreements, restructuring the new, foreign-
owned corporation to create "firewalls" between the new owners and
security-related functions.42
The DOJ or the Department of Defense, and now the DHS,
negotiate Network Security Agreements directly with the foreign
purchaser, without the full participation of CFIUS members and
independent of the CFIUS review.43 The chief weakness in Network
Security Agreements lies not in their negotiation, but in what follows, or
rather, what does not follow-the inability or lack of ensuring compliance.
Once a Network Security Agreement is reached and CFIUS approval
granted, there is no systematic process in CFIUS to assign an agency the
38. Homeland Security Executive Order, supra note 26.
39. NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE NCS, at
http://www.ncs.gov/about.html (last reviewed Mar. 22, 2004).
40. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 800, subpts. E, F (2003).
41. While most network security agreements are not public, their existence is not secret.
See Reynolds, supra note 36; Steptoe and Johnson, Law Enforcement and Technology
Practice, at http://www.steptoe.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=ws.DspSite&siteid=462 (last
visited May 2, 2005); Akin Trade Alert, supra note 28.
42. See, e.g., GLOBAL CROSSING CORPORATION, RAISING THE BAR FOR NETWORK
SECURITY: THE NETWORK SECURITY AGREEMENT AMONG GLOBAL CROSSING, ST TELEMEDIA
AND SEVERAL U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, available at http://www.globalcrossing.com/
xmllnetwork/net security.xml. (last visited Apr. 3, 2005) (discussing the specific terms that
Global Crossing agreed to in its Network Security Agreement).
43. See, e.g., Global Crossing Ltd. et al., Applications for Consent to Transfer Control
of Submarine Cable Landing Licenses, Order and Authorization, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,301, Sec. F
(2003).
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responsibility for ensuring compliance and there is no systematic effort to
enforce Network Security Agreements. A similar weakness is the lack of
clarity as to which agency has authority to enforce the agreements. The
lack of enforcement to ensure compliance with a Network Security
Agreement makes the entire process somewhat questionable. There is some
speculation that either the DHS will claim that it has this responsibility or
that the White House will assign the DHS this responsibility via a new
presidential directive as part of its larger infrastructure protection
responsibilities.
In recent years, the most challenging cases before CFIUS involved
the telecommunications and information technology sectors, as European
and Asian firms sought to acquire telecommunications service providers
like VoiceStream, Global Crossing, or high-tech manufacturers like Silicon
Valley Group ("SVG").44 Three trends-privatization, the introduction of
new services, and successful efforts in the WTO to break down the barriers
to firms in one country providing telecommunications services in other
countries--created international opportunities that attract foreign
ownership.
The most salient case involves Global Crossing. Its $20 billion global
fiber optic network crosses both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and
connects twenty-seven countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe. Global Crossing provided key services to a broad range of U.S.
entities in both the public and private sectors, including the Department of
Defense.45 The company filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and was the target of
several acquisition attempts, including offers by foreign companies.46 The
bid by Hong Kong firm Hutchison Whampoa raised serious national
44. SVG is a United States manufacturer of leading edge photolithography technologies
that was bought by a Netherlands company. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE, WHITE PAPER: NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE GLOBAL MIGRATION OF
THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 9 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2003_cr/s060503.html; Press Release, Senate Republican High Tech Task Force, High Tech
Task Force Members Urge Expeditious Review of SVG-ASML Merger (Apr. 11, 2001), at
http://republican.senate.gov/httf/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease
_id=10&Month=4&Year=-2001. See also Jeff Chappel, Politics Hamper SVG-ASML
Merger, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001, at http://www.reed-electronics.com/
electronicnews/article/CA66153.html; David Richardson, Foreign Investment and the
Australia United States Free Trade Agreement, Parliament of Australia, Economics,
Commerce and Industrial Relations Group, Current Issues Brief No. 7 2003-04, (Mar.
2004), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2003-04/O4cibO7.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Press Release, Global Crossing, Global Crossing Wins Network Services
Contract From U.S. Department of Defense Valued up to $400 Million (July 9, 2001),
available at http://www.globalcrossing.com/xml/news/2001/july/09.xml.
46. Reuters, Global Crossing Says Has More than 60 Suitors (May 8, 2002), available
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/telecom/2002-05-08-global-suitors.htm.
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security concerns within the U.S. government. After a protracted CFIUS
review in the face of considerable hostility toward Hutchison from some
agencies, Hutchison Whampoa's offer was withdrawn.47
Singapore Technologies Telemedia ("STT") ultimately purchased
Global Crossing in December 2003 (after CFIUS approval in September
and FCC approval in October).48 STT holds a 71 percent share of the
company. Despite the conclusion of a free trade agreement between
Singapore and the United States, STT also faced some opposition, in part
because STT is partially owned by the Singaporean government.
49
The crux of the opposition to Hutchison was the company's alleged
connections to the Chinese government.50 Senior Chinese government
officials are reputedly among Hutchison's stockholders. The Department of
Defense and others feared that China could use this investment relationship
to influence Hutchison and particularly to obtain access to Global
Crossing's communications networks; Hutchison's bid was hurt by these
allegations. Hutchison is clearly a legitimate, commercial, publicly-traded
entity with a long history of business success, but Chinese intelligence
entities have used their ownership stake in foreign companies as a means to
obtain controlled technology. 51 The fear that the Chinese government, if
given the opportunity, would extend the use of this technology to collect
communications is not an unreasonable fear. Two earlier CFIUS cases
involving U.S. telecommunications service providers help put Global
47. See Jack Schafer, Richard Perle Libel Watch, Week 3: Now he's playing defense,
SLATE MAGAZINE, Mar. 26, 2003, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2080743. See also Press
Release, Office of U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf, Wolf Voices Concern about Proposed Sale of
Global Crossing: Wants DOJ, State Department, DOD, Treasury and FCC to Fully Review
Proposed Transaction (Apr. 9, 2003), at http:llwww.house.gov/wolf/news/2003/04-09-
SaleGlobalCrossing.html [hereinafter Wolf Press Release] (Representative Wolf was
Chairman of the House Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Subcommittee when this
was released).
48. Press Release, Global Crossing, Global Crossing Receives CFIUS Approval for ST
Telemedia Investment (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.globalcrossing.com/xml/
news/2003/september/19.xml; Press Release, Global Crossing, ST Telemedia and Global
Crossing Secure Final Regulatory Approval (Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.globalcrossing.com/xml/news/2003loctober/08.xml.
49. "The FBI, CIA and the Pentagon had objected to the STr sale, arguing that the firm
was too close to the Singaporean Government." Global Crossing Sale Finally Agreed, BBC
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/3176630.stm.
50. See Wolf Press Release, supra note 48.
51. "Computer-assisted analysis of China's exposed technology-related economic
espionage activities in the United States reveals three basic operational patterns.... Second,
American companies with access to the desired level of technology are purchased outright
by Chinese state-run firms .... Terrorism and Intelligence Operations: Hearing Before the
J. Economic Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Nicholas Eftimiades), available at
http://www.fas.org/irplcongress/1998_hr/eftimiad.htm. See also PBS, How China Spies, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pageslfrontline/showslspy/spies/ (last visited May 9, 2005).
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Crossing in perspective. A subsidiary of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph
("NTT"), which had the Japanese government as its majority shareholder at
the time, was given permission to buy Verio, an Internet service provider,
once FBI concerns about potential interference with its wiretapping efforts
were resolved.52 The DOJ and the FBI were concerned that Japanese law,
which prohibits wiretapping of Japanese citizens (but which allows
Japanese authorities to wiretap non-Japanese) could potentially complicate
some criminal cases.53 The FBI was concerned that Japanese entities could
use NTT to gain access to information about surveillance efforts and
technologies or information about U.S. customers. 54 The FBI also wanted
assurance that Verio's servers and data would remain in the United States
and accessible to properly authorized law enforcement after the
acquisition.55
The DOJ and the FBI, under the CFIUS framework, negotiated with
NTT to obtain procedures that would protect sensitive information, make it
easier for law enforcement officers to request information from Verio, and
ensure that Verio customer information was not disclosed to unauthorized
parties.56 One part of the agreement, according to press reports, was that
52. "Less than two years ago, NTT paid a whopping $5.5 billion for Verio, in a deal
that had to be cleared by the Clinton administration after the FBI raised national-security
issues." Mark Lewis, NTT Taking A Bath On Verio, FORBES, Apr. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/04/04/0404ntt.html.
53. See Brian Quinton, Welcome to America - almost.... TELEPHONY ONLINE, Aug.
21, 2000, at http://www.telephonyonline.comlar/telecom-welcomeamericaalmost/
index.html.
54, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, along with the Justice Department and the
Pentagon, worries the deal could give the Japanese government-controlled company access
to U.S. government wiretapping activity and could present an espionage risk." Neil King Jr.
& David S. Cloud, U.S. Pushes to Resolve Debate on NTT-Verio, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
2000, at A2-A14, available at http://cryptome.org/verio-ntt-sec.htm [hereinafter U.S.
Pushes to Resolve NIT Debate].
"Even when the foreign entity controlling a U.S. communications network is
privately held, there is cause for concern that the foreign-affiliated carrier may be subject to
the influence and directives of the foreign government .... Foreign Government
Ownership of American Telecommunications Companies: Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection, House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 43-
47 (2000) (statement of Larry R. Parkinson, General Counsel, FBI) [hereinafter Parkinson
Statement on Foreign Government Ownership of Telecomm. Companies].
"Within Japan, the Japanese government is believed to monitor all
telecommunications traffic from U.S. corporations located in Japan." PETER SCHWEIZER,
FRIENDLY SPIES: How AMERICA'S ALLIES ARE USING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO STEAL OUR
SECRETS18-19 (1993). See also JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 3-17(1999).
55. Associated Press, NTT-Verio Deal Sparks FBI concern, CNET NEWS.COM (July 6,
2000), at http://news.com.com/2100-1033-242823.html?legacy=cnet.
56. U.S. Pushes to Resolve NTT Debate, supra note 55.
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NTT would create a separate division within Verio staffed only by U.S.
citizens who would be responsible for surveillance requests. 7 According to
press reports, other FBI agreements also sought to restrict non-U.S.
citizens' access to customers' billing and calling information. 5 8
Deutsche Telekom's proposal to purchase VoiceStream Wireless
created similar concerns. Deutsche Telekom's majority owner at the time
of the case was the German government. 59 This led some in Congress to
complain that the partial ownership by a foreign government would pose
anticompetitive and national security issues. 60 CFIUS recommended that
the acquisition be approved by the President after the FBI and Deutsche
Telekom came to an agreement that assured the FBI that it would still be
able to conduct wiretaps after the acquisition.61
In both of these cases, concerns over potential interference with U.S.
law enforcement operations or with foreign access to U.S. communications
led to investigation. These concerns were reinforced as the foreign acquirer
in each case was partially owned by its home government, reflecting the
movement toward privatization in the larger context of telecommunication
liberalization. Access to U.S. communications and potential involvement of
foreign governments also generated concern in the Global Crossing case.
There is anecdotal evidence for another case where a foreign
telecommunications company that operated on a global basis had its
acquisition of a U.S. company delayed by CFIUS, pending conclusion of a
side agreement with U.S. agencies. The side agreement required the foreign
company not only to cooperate with agencies in the United States, but also
to cooperate with U.S. agencies in communication interceptions in a
Caribbean country deeply involved in narcotics trafficking. According to
company executives, these proposed extraterritorial requirements
57. "NT1r was forced to create a separate division within Verio, staffed and run only by
U.S. citizens, to work exclusively as the interface between the ISP and the FBI." Arik
Hesseldahl, Around-The-Globe: Federal Bureau Of Interference, FORBES.COM, at
http://www.dotcomeon.com/fbi.html (last visited May 9, 2005).
58. See Quinton, supra note 54; Neil King Jr. & David S. Cloud, Hang Ups: Global
Phone Deals Face Scrutiny From New Source: the FBI, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at Al.
59. DEUTSCHE TELEKOM ANNUAL REPORT 2003, NOTES TO THE CONSOLIDATED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTING POLICIES, at
http://www.annualreport2003.telekom.de/site/en/ka/konzernanhang/index.php?tcfs=f6aa2b9
0e9348c5d8556eed72ff9dda5&c=1085212960.
60. FCC approval was also required for the acquisition, but the FCC deferred to CFIUS
in this case. See, e.g., Voicestream Wireless Corporation, Powertel Inc. Transferors, et al,
Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, 15 F.C.C.R. 3341, 3383
(2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/FurchtgottRoth/Statements/2001/
sthfrl30.pdf.
61. Arik Hesseldahl, Around-The-Globe: Federal Bureau Of Interference, FORBES,
Dec. 20, 2000, available at http://www.forbes.com/2000/12/20/1220atg.html.
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ultimately contributed to a decision by the foreign company to stop
62pursuing the acquisition.
One of the new challenges for CFIUS is that ownership no longer
adequately describes the range of potential foreign involvement in a
communications network. The ranges of activities that create potential risks
for security can be classified as Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence
("FOCI").63 CFIUS authorities are not sufficient to cover actions that do
not reach the level of ownership but which do provide a foreign entity with
increased access and control. Consequently, the Committee and its
authorities have come under renewed scrutiny.
Efforts to strengthen the CFIUS process in response to the perceived
risks of foreign ownership of telecommunications service providers reflect
the larger issue of the evolution of sovereignty in response to changes in
the international economy. This evolution is likely to continue. Previous
concepts of sovereignty and state authority included, if only by implication,
an assumption of national ownership of critical industries. The national
ownership gave governments an extra and informal measure of control and
influence. This allowed them to assume a higher level of trust and security
for the provision of critical goods and services. However, a focus on the
country of origin provides an increasingly uncertain value toward
mitigating risk.
III. RISKS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
The risk posed by foreign ownership is easy to overestimate, but it
cannot be dismissed. The categories of risk are the following: damage to
law enforcement interception capabilities, economic espionage, and the
potential for damage to critical infrastructures. Of these categories,
economic espionage is an increasing threat, because a number of countries
engage in this activity and may use ownership of U.S. companies to aid
their collection efforts. 64 The widely held suspicion that a few countries'
intelligence services-such as China's or France's-routinely exploit
access to national telecommunications companies, where the government
holds a stake for domestic intelligence purposes, makes it reasonable to
assume that the same tactic might be attractive for foreign operations.
A key concept for assessing the risk is not whether foreign purchases
increase the risk of economic espionage in some absolute sense, but
62. Based upon the Author's interviews with company executives, who wished to
remain anonymous.
63. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATING MANUAL, supra note 37.
64. JAMES LEWIS, GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: MAINTAINING U.S.
TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH 28-30 (2004).
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whether they increase the risk relative to other potential avenues for the
collection of economic intelligence. Prohibiting foreign ownership makes
little sense if this ultimately does not degrade an opponent's ability to
collect information. In this light, foreign purchases of U.S.
telecommunications services probably do not greatly increase the risk of
economic espionage, as there are many other avenues to collect information
that work as well or better. Emplacing an agent as a foreign national
employee in a U.S. firm or recruiting a U.S. citizen may be a cheaper and
more effective approach.
65
The risk to law enforcement intercept capabilities comes from three
different sources: the bluffing of jurisdiction, the potential for a foreign-
owned company to be less cooperative than an American firm, and the
possible clash of legal authorities. This clash of legal authorities arises in
two different ways. First, the determination of when and against whom
intercepts can be authorized, and second, the possibility that operational
data might be stored outside the United States, thus becoming more
difficult to reach under U.S. law. This clash of legal authorities is probably
the greatest source of risk, since economics might impel a business to
centralize data outside the United States in order to cut costs.
The clash of legal authorities is in part a problem of international law
enforcement cooperation and harmonization of national laws, rather than of
foreign ownership. Although there have been improvements since
September 11, many procedures for law enforcement cooperation are still
rooted in the stately pace of diplomacy in the early twentieth century and
rely on Letters Rogatory66 or bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
("MLATs").67 These treaties differ in scope from country to country and
are difficult to negotiate because they raise complex sovereignty issues.68
65. See generally OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE,
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE-2003 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.nacic.gov/publications/reports-
speeches/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf.
66. "A letter rogatory is a formal request from a court in one country to 'the appropriate
judicial authorities' in another country requesting service of process." PROCESS
FORWARDING INTERNATIONAL, LETTERS ROGATORY, available at
http://www.hagueservice.net/lr.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2005).
67. See BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2004),
available at http://www.state.govlglinl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/htmli/29914.htm; DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL, Title 9, Section 276, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usam/title9/text/t9rmO2.wpd (last
visited Apr. 20, 2005).
68. See James Lewis, Strengthening Law Enforcement Capabilities to Combat
Terrorism, in To PREVAIL: AN AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
TERRORISM (2001), available at http://www.csis.org/tech/strengh-law-enforce.pdf
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Strengthening existing MLATs and seeking broader multilateral
arrangements could reduce the concern that foreign ownership might lead
to a reduction in cooperation with law enforcement requests, but this is a
long-term prospect, and in the interim the CFIUS process will continue to
be used to meet law enforcement concerns.
The need to use CFIUS to ensure continued law enforcement access
may become less pressing as national legal authorities for communications
interception converge into common accepted international practices. In part
this is the result of the need for increased cooperation that is required to
respond to cybercrime.69 Many countries either already possess more
extensive legal access to communications than the United States, as with
the United Kingdom or France, or are moving to bring their governmental
enforcement power closer to U.S. practices, as with Japan. 70 Additionally,
cooperation does not appear to be a problem since most companies, foreign
or domestic, seem willing to help law enforcement and there are no reports
to the contrary. The potential for a loss of confidentiality and the possibility
of political constraints from foreign owners, however, do remain issues.
The primary issue for critical infrastructure protection is whether
foreign ownership increases vulnerability. Vulnerability, in this regard, has
two aspects: the ability to disrupt vital services and the ability to exploit
ownership for greater access to communications. By estimating the risk
created by scenarios where ownership can provide an advantage and then
comparing these scenarios to alternatives, one can establish a metric for
risk and vulnerability. In doing so, an initial conclusion could be that
foreign ownership is only one source of vulnerability among many, and
that its risks may be overstated.
Opportunity cost is an immediate consideration. There may be
alternative approaches to either disruption or for communications
interception that work as well without the cost of ownership. Discussion
among the agencies that make up CFIUS has been broadened to consider
FOCI in recognition that ownership is not the only, or even best, avenue for
(discussing sovereignty issues involved with MLATS).
69. See James K. Robinson, Remarks at the International Computer Crime Conference
(May 29-31, 2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/roboslo.htm; G8
Information Centre, Presidents Summary: Meeting of G8 Ministers of Justice and Home
Affairs (May 5, 2003) at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/justice/justice030505.htm.
70. Wiretapping, numbering bills clear Diet in all-night session, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 12,
1999, available at http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn19990812al.htm;
Hiroshi Matsubara, Wiretap Law: Hard to Use, Easy to Abuse, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003,
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn2003112 1b3.htm;
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23, Pt. I (Eng.), available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uklacts/acts/2000/00023--b.htm.
[Vol. 57
NEW OBJECTIVES FOR CFIUS
potential opponents to exploit the communications infrastructure. 7' In this
context, risk may be high and vulnerability may increase, but foreign
ownership is not the cause of this increase.
Access provided by ownership is not essential for communications
interception. There may be an advantage to having direct access to business
records, user information, and switches, but at best, this simplifies or
shortens the time needed for these tasks. Physical access is valuable for
interception of communications over fiber-optic networks, but it can also
be obtained clandestinely rather than through purchase of the network. In
general, the advantages provided by ownership can be duplicated by other
techniques, such as recruiting company employees, forming partnerships,
or having an agent gain employment with the target service provider.
International telecommunications also involves complex partnering
arrangements that could substitute in some areas for direct ownership.
The risk to critical infrastructure includes potential foreign access to
communications for intelligence purposes, but also includes the potential
for disruption of service. These activities, however, are unlikely categories
of activity for terrorist groups. Al Qaeda, for example, is unlikely to
purchase American telecommunications companies in order to gain the
ability to disrupt the telephone services. The threat of service disruption
lies elsewhere, with nations rather than subnational groups. Concern over
foreign government access to information and infrastructure through the
purchase of U.S. service providers is the primary motivation for increased
scrutiny of foreign investment in U.S. companies.
If ownership is not in itself the sole factor for increasing the risks to
telecommunications services, does this mean that CFIUS need not be
reinforced? At a minimum, the limited increase in risk created by foreign
ownership suggests that reinforcing regulatory oversight of transactions
involving foreign purchasers is unlikely to materially reduce risk and
vulnerability, particularly if oversight is greatly reduced once the
transaction is completed. Potential opponents will adopt other methods that
take advantage of increased economic integration to avoid CFIUS
oversight. Another consideration is whether efforts to minimize the risks of
foreign ownership, or alternative sources of risk such as foreign
participation in the workforce or foreign technology suppliers, can be
implemented without doing harm to the economy and long-term interests of
the United States, where these interests outweigh any possible security
benefit. These considerations alone justify a degree of caution in seeking
new authorities.
71. Parkinson Statement on Foreign Government Ownership of Telecomm. Companies,
supra note 54.
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Ownership of infrastructure provides some advantages to a potential
opponent, but is not critical for espionage or attacks on critical
infrastructure. In some ways, the economic and technological changes that
called attention to the risk of foreign ownership also acted to reduce that
risk. While individual companies cannot afford the redundancy found in the
old national monopoly systems,72 the development of multiple service
providers with multiple networks achieves a similar degree of security.
Diversity of ownership and of telecommunications systems works against
the possibility of a catastrophic attack and dilutes the risks of foreign
ownership of the telecommunications infrastructure.
The risks from foreign ownership of U.S. telecommunications
infrastructure are probably overstated, but one of the hallmarks of
homeland security analysis in the United States is a willingness to adopt an
exceptionally risk-averse approach to potential threats. Bureaucracies tend
to be inherently risk-averse and the events of September 11 increased this
tendency. While the probability of attacks on infrastructure by foreign
owners is very low, the likelihood of attack does not shape regulations;
instead, the potential damage that could arise if one of these improbable
events were to occur shapes our regulations.
IV. NEW GOALS FOR REGULATION
U.S. policies generally encourage foreign investment in and
ownership of American companies. Most of these acquisitions hold no risk
for security. However, in the post-Cold War security environment-with
concerns regarding economic espionage, critical infrastructure protection,
and homeland security-support for foreign investment and ownership is
no longer harmless.
Foreign investment is essential for the U.S. economy. In some
circumstances, however, foreign investment also creates challenges for
security, particularly if it involves access to, or control of, key
infrastructures or advanced technologies. Previous concerns over
technology transfer and economic espionage led to efforts strengthening the
CFIUS process. In 1993, Congress amended Exon-Florio to require
foreign, government-controlled companies to obtain CFIUS approval
before acquiring U.S. companies when the foreign purchaser is "controlled
by or acting on behalf of a foreign government" and the acquisition "could
result in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. that
72. This pertains to old national monopoly system where the cost of redundant
capabilities or hardened faculties could be passed on to all rate payers who did not have the
option of switching to a lower cost provider.
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could affect the national security of the United States. 73 New and more
restrictive policies proposed by the Department of Defense were not
adopted.74
In the wake of Global Crossing, the U.S. government began to
reconsider the process by which it reviews potential foreign acquisitions of
U.S. companies. In particular, a review of the risks of foreign ownership of
the telecommunications infrastructure commenced. Deregulation, the
internationalization of economies, new technologies, and new kinds of
threats guarantee that security agencies will continue to seek regulatory
changes that, from their perspective, either reduce risk or preserve
capabilities.
It is possible that these reviews will recommend expansion of federal
oversight of foreign acquisitions, at least for foreign acquisitions of critical
infrastructure. Critical infrastructure protection and the preservation of
communications interception capabilities are goals of the CFIUS review
process. In this sense, changes in CFIUS that better address transnational
threats and communications interception risks would complement the
changes in the Patriot Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act to manage risk and maintain capabilities. Moving forward
in adjusting to the new situation in telecommunications will require first an
evolution in thinking about sovereignty and governmental authorities to
accommodate an integrated international economy and second, the
development of new authorities and techniques to lower risk and improve
security.
Change is recurring and continuous for technology and economies.
Changes in the authorities that govern and enable communications
interception, at least in the United States, come in discontinuous clumps.
This discontinuous process of mapping government authorities to the
technological and business environment creates legitimate civil liberty and
business concerns, which in themselves make the policy and regulatory
process more complex and iterative when it comes to government action to
preserve essential services.
73. Exon-Florio Provision, supra note 27 (citing 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2002)).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (2000). Section 837(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1993 (the "Byrd Amendment") amended Exon-Florio to require a CFIUS
investigation when the acquiring company is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government and the acquisition "could result in control of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the United States." §
2710(b). For the Department of Defense proposals, see JOINT SECURITY COMMISSION,
REDEFINING SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ch. 6 (1994), at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/jsc-
report.pdf.
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The next set of changes in regulation will not be driven by
technology, but by changes in the international economy and by new
perceptions of risk. Efforts to strengthen the CFIUS process-in response
to the perceived risks of foreign ownership of telecommunications service
providers-reflect the larger issue of the evolution of sovereignty in
response to changes in the international economy. This evolution is likely
to continue. Previous concepts of sovereignty and state authority included,
if only by implication, an assumption of national ownership of critical
industries. This national ownership gave governments an extra and
informal measure of control and influence and allowed them to assume a
higher level of trust and security for the provision of critical goods and
services. However, a focus on the country of ownership is increasingly of
uncertain value for mitigating risk.
